

# POL 737: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

---

Professor Lauren L. Ferry  
Department of Political Science  
Office Hours: M 2-3pm and W 10-11am

leferry@olemiss.edu  
Fall 2022  
Deupree 226

---

## Course Description:

Why do governments adopt the economic policies they do? How do economic forces impact domestic and international politics? In this course we will examine the theoretic approaches and contemporary research in International Political Economy (IPE). We will focus on three types of cross-border flows and the politics that regulate them: the flow of goods (trade), capital (monetary and financial relations, investment) and labor (migration). We will also apply different units of analysis to understand how international economic interactions affect voters, politicians, interest groups, firms, countries, and international organizations. We will conclude by discussing the frontiers of current academic research.

This is a specialized graduate seminar with article-length readings that cover the substantive topics above. Students are expected to be conversant in quantitative methods, meaning that they are able to read and engage with quantitative research papers in top journals and perform at least preliminary quantitative research of their own. My goal is for students to be exposed to current theoretical debates and the methods used to evaluate these debates in order to position current work within the broader research tradition. I hope that this course will generate new ideas that can contribute to the future trajectory of the field.

## Requirements:

- **Class Participation and Discussion Leadership (20%):** Each week students should come to class prepared to discuss the following questions:
  - What is the theme that connects the required readings?
  - What is each authors' research question?
  - What is each authors' theoretical argument?
  - What are the theoretical assumptions? Are they reasonable - why or why not?
  - How do the authors test their theoretical argument?
  - What conclusions do the authors reach? Is the authors' evidence compelling - why or why not?
  - What is the contribution of each piece? Where does this fit with the broader literature?
  - What other researchable questions are raised by the readings?

Reading and discussing academic journal articles is a skill. To enrich our discussions, I have provided a worksheet to guide you towards the key takeaways in any piece you read. **You must complete and turn in a worksheet for each reading in Week 2** (5 worksheets total). After that the exercise is optional, but I encourage you to maintain the mental process even if you choose not to physically complete the worksheets. The exercise is particularly helpful for discussion leadership, reaction papers, and comprehensive exam studying.

**Each student will also be responsible for leading one day of class discussion.** Leaders should be prepared to identify major themes and debates and to probe the strengths and weaknesses of current research in each subject. Leaders should avoid summarizing the readings and instead challenge their colleagues to think about how to advance the current state of the literature. Weeks will be assigned at the first class session and a large portion of your participation grade will be dependent on your performance as a discussion leader

Absences from class will be noticed. In the event of an excused absence (i.e. illness, conference travel, etc.), students may makeup the class period by completing an additional reaction paper (described below). This will be *in addition* to the two required papers. Students may only complete one makeup; additional absences are strongly discouraged and will result in a lower course grade.

- **Reaction Papers** (30% total, 15% each): Each student will produce two reaction papers, designed to synthesize and critique a week's readings. While a reaction paper need not cover every assigned reading, it should address the week's readings from a holistic perspective, highlighting commonalities and debates. Reaction papers should be 4-5 double spaced pages and begin with a brief summary of the topic (in your own words) and its main contribution. Summary should not make up the bulk of your paper; Instead, use the remainder of the paper to make a clear point about the topic's trajectory. The assignment is intentionally vague, as there are many possible critiques or reactions to each set of readings. Helpful starting points might include:
  - What are the theoretic or methodological strengths and weaknesses?
  - Are there questions raised but unanswered in the readings?
  - Are there disagreements amongst the readings and where do those disagreements stem from? Can the differences be reconciled?
  - Are there future research ideas that could extend, better evaluate, or correct the body of literature?
  - Are there underlying assumptions that all of the readings share? Are they reasonable? Are they testable.

A 4-5 page paper will not be able to answer all questions or address every potential critique; You should choose a main point that you feel represents your strongest reaction. Weeks will be assigned during the first class session and **reaction papers cannot overlap with discussion leadership**. They are due in class on the day the readings are assigned.

- **Referee Reports** (20% total, 10% each): Students will complete two mock peer reviews during the semester, as noted in Weeks 6 and 9 of the syllabus. The highlighted readings are working papers that students should pretend were sent to them by a journal editor for peer review. As is appropriate in a professional peer review, students should briefly summarize the authors' argument and evidence (1 paragraph), comment on strengths, identify potential weaknesses, and provide suggestions for revision where appropriate. Reviews vary in length but are typically 1.5-2 pages in length. They include the main comments to be shared with the author and a separate recommendation to the editor of accept, revise and resubmit, or reject. Examples and further instructions will be provided in class. Referee reports are due in class on the day the readings are assigned. Please come to class prepared to discuss and defend your report.
- **Original Ideas Paper** (30%): Students will prepare a 15-20 page paper on an original topic related to international political economy. The goal of the paper is to expand on a novel insight that could be the basis for future publishable work. Your original idea may be a theoretical contribution, an improvement in research design, an empirical innovation or some combination. Regardless of the nature of your contribution, all papers should have a clear contribution and be clear about where the paper fits in the broader literature. They should then articulate a theoretical argument, which may build on previous work or be more novel. You should identify a research design and provide *preliminary* evidence. Preliminary evidence may include quantitative analyses (regressions), basic correlations and summary statistics, or a brief description of a case that fits your theoretical mechanism. The goal is to convince the reader that the project proposed is likely to bare fruitful results if you followed it through to fruition. While a successful paper must contain each of the mentioned elements, the weight of each section will depend on the contribution you make. If the contribution is theoretical, the theoretical

argument should be well-developed and the bulk of the paper. If the contribution is in research design, then a briefer theory that builds on previous work is acceptable as the aim is to have a well-specified and advanced methods section.

To help advance the project across the full semester, several intermediate deadlines have been set. A research question is due during Week 8. An annotated bibliography (with at least 10 sources outside of the reading list) is due Week 11. After that, I will provide comments in one-on-one meetings. During our final class period (Week 14) students will participate in a mock conference. All students will prepare 12 minute presentations that will be grouped into thematic panels followed by Q&A. A hard copy of your final paper will be due electronically by Wednesday, December 7th.

### Additional Information:

- **COVID-19 Policy** Covid-19 Policy. If you need to isolate due to contracting COVID-19 at any point this semester, you must do so. Please do not attend class if you are feeling ill or are experiencing COVID-19. If you test positive, report test results to <https://coronavirus.olemiss.edu/report/> and email me as soon as possible. I will work with you to help you continue your progress in the course. More information on isolation protocols can be found at <https://healthcenter.olemiss.edu/covid-19-faqs/>. Follow the most up-to-date guidance from the CDC: <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/isolation.html>.
- **Disability Policy:** The University of Mississippi is committed to the creation of inclusive learning environments for all students. If there are aspects of the instruction or design of this course that result in barriers to your full inclusion and participation, or to accurate assessment of your achievement, please contact the course instructor as soon as possible. Barriers may include, but are not necessarily limited to, timed exams and in-class assignments, difficulty with the acquisition of lecture content, inaccessible web content, and the use of non-captioned or non-transcribed video and audio files. If you are registered with SDS, you must log in to your Rebel Access portal at <https://sds.olemiss.edu/rebel-access-portal> to request approved accommodations. If you are NOT registered with SDS, you must complete the process to become registered. To begin that process, please visit <https://sds.olemiss.edu/apply-for-services>.
- **Late Policy:** Except for exceptional circumstances, no late work will be accepted. If you are aware of existing conflicts, please communicate them as soon as possible so that alternative arrangements can be made.
- **Academic Integrity:** Students are expected to do their own work without unauthorized aid of any kind. Students caught cheating or engaging in academic misconduct, including plagiarism, will receive a failing grade in the course and be reported according to university policy. As a general rule, if you are not sure whether a certain action is considered academic dishonestly, don't do it and ask first. For more information about academic misconduct, please refer to The M Book (available at <https://communications.olemiss.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/10/MBook.pdf>).
- **Technology Policy:** Please turn off cell phones before coming to class, or in emergent circumstances inform me that you are expecting a call. This means that cell phones must be on silent (not vibrate) and inappropriate cell phone use will result in lost participation credit. Laptops and tablets will be allowed during class. However, if technology becomes a distraction, I reserve the right to reevaluate the technology policy. Please be aware of the signals you are sending to me and your peers with your body language and eye contact.
- **Blackboard:** All course materials are available on Blackboard, including an electronic syllabi and additional readings. Updates and announcements will be also be posted through Blackboard so make sure you either enable notifications or routinely check our course page.

- **Email and Office Hours:** I value open communication and email is the easiest way to get in touch with me about questions, comments, concerns etc. I will do my best to answer your emails within 24 hours Monday-Friday and 48 hours over the weekend. If you have not received a response from me after that time, please email me again. I also have “official” office hours on Monday from 2-3pm and Wednesday from 10-11am; However I’m often in my office so feel free to stop by.

**Readings and Schedule:** Each section represents a topic of class discussion and is divided into “Required” and “Recommended” reading groups. Required readings will be discussed in class and I suggest completing the readings in the order that they are listed. Recommended readings will not be included in class discussions but provide important background information and extensions; you should also be familiar with these readings but they are not listed in a particular order. Completing the recommended list, in addition to the required, will be excellent preparation for those writing comprehensive exams.

- **Suggested Background Materials:** For those less familiar with IPE, I recommend Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz’ reference text. You can use any edition, but some of the earlier iterations may not include new, new trade theory.

Krugman, Paul, Maurice Obstfeld, and Marc Melitz. 2017. *International Economics: Theory and Policy*. Boston, MA: Pearson

- **Recommended Data Sources:** For the original ideas paper, students are encouraged to draw on a comprehensive database of variables common to political economy research. It is available in both country-year and dyad-year formats.

Graham, Benjamin A.T. and Jacob R. Tucker. 2019. “The International Political Economy Data Resource.” *Review of International Organizations* 14(1): 149-161.

## 1. Introduction to International Political Economy

- Frieden, Jeffrey. 2007. *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century*. New York: W. W. Norton. [Skim entire book]  
\* I recommend purchasing the text as a reference. It provides a nice overview of key subjects and historical moments in IPE. For Week 1, come to class with questions and observations. What is new to you? What is interesting to you? What is confusing? The bar is low! These questions will guide our discussion of what IPE is.
- Lake, David. 2009. “Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review.” *Review of International Organizations* 4:219-244
- Blythe, Mark and Matthias Matthijs. 2017. “Black Swans, Lame Ducks, and the Mystery of IPE’s Missing Macroeconomy.” *Review of International Political Economy* 24(2): 203-231.

## 2. Individuals and Trade

Required:

- Scheve, Kenneth F. and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. “What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preferences?” *Journal of International Economics* 54(2): 267-292.
- Ladewig, Jeffrey W. 2006. “Domestic Influences on International Trade Policy: Factor Mobility in the United States, 1963-1992.” *International Organization* 60(1): 69-103.
- Rho, Sungmin and Michael Tomz. 2017. “Why Don’t Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest.” *International Organization* 71(S1): 85-108.
- Mansfield, Edward D. and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. “Support for Free Trade: Self Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety.” *International Organization* 63(3): 425-457.

- Brutger, Ryan and Brian Rathbun. 2021. "Fair Share? Equality and Equity in American Attitudes Toward Trade." *International Organization* 75(3): 880-900.

Recommended:

- Rogowski, John G. 1987. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." *International Organization* 36(2): 195-231.
- Baldwin, Robert and Christopher S. Magee. 2000. "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills." *Public Choice* 105: 79-101.
- Hiscox, Michael. 2001. "Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade." *International Organization* 55(1): 1-46.
- Mayda, Anna and Dani Rodrik. 2005. "Why are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others?" *European Economic Review* 49(6): 1393-1430.
- Hainmueller, Jens and Michael Hiscox. 2006. "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade." *International Organization* 60(2): 469-498.
- Guisinger, Alexandra. 2009. "Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?" *International Organization* 60(3): 533-557.
- Jeong, Gyung-Ho. 2009. "Constitutional Influence on International Trade Policy in the United States, 1987-2006." *International Studies Quarterly* 53(2): 519-540.
- Lu, Xiaobo, Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter. 2012. "Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3): 638-654.
- Walter, Stefanie. 2010. "Globalization and the Welfare State: Testing the Microfoundations of the Compensation Hypothesis." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(2): 403-426.

### 3. Domestic Institutions and Trade

Required:

- Bailey, Michael, Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. "The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade." *World Politics* 49(3): 309-338.
- Karol, David. 2007. "Does Constituency Size Affect Elected Officials' Trade Policy Preferences?" *Journal of Politics* 69(3): 633-648.
- Feigenbaum, James J. and Andrew B. Hall. 2015. "How Legislators Respond to Localized Economic Shocks: Evidence from Chinese Import Competition." *The Journal of Politics* 77(4): 1012-1030.
- Milner, Helen and Keiko Kubota. 2005. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries." *International Organization* 59(1): 107-143.
- Davis, Christina, Andreas Fuchs and Kristina Johnson. 2019. "State Control and the Effects of Foreign Relations on Bilateral Trade." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(2): 405-438.

Recommended:

- Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions." *International Organization* 41(2): 203-223.
- Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner and Peter Rosendorff. 2000. "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade." *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 305-321.

- Nielson, Daniel L. 2003. "Supplying Trade Reform: Political Institutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income Presidential Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science*. 47(3): 470-491.
- Henisz, Witold and Edward Mansfield. 2006. "Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness." *International Studies Quarterly* 50(1): 189-211.
- Erlich, Sean D. 2007. "Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies." *International Organization* 61(3): 571-605.
- J. Ernesto Lopez-Cordova and Christopher M. Meissner. 2008. "The Impact of International Trade on Democracy: A Long-Run Perspective." *World Politics* 60(4): 539-575.
- Margalit, Yotam. 2011. "Costly Jobs: Trade Related Layoffs, Government Compensation and Voting in US Elections." *American Political Science Review* 105(1): 169-188.
- Paola, Conconi, Giovanni Facchini and Maurizio Zanardi. 2014. "Policymakers' Horizon and Trade Reforms: The Protectionist Effect of Elections." *Journal of International Economics* 94(1): 102-118.
- Kim, Sung Eun and Yotam Margalit. 2017. "Informed Preferences? The Impact of Unions on Workers' Policy Views." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(3): 728-743.

#### 4. International Institutions and Trade

Required:

- Rosendorff, B. Peter and Helen Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape." *International Organization* 55(4): 829-857.
- Kucik, Jeff and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation?" An Application to the Global Trade Regime." *International Organization* 62(3): 477-505.
- Goldstein, Judith, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade." *International Organization* 61(1): 37-67.
- Ryu, Jeheung and Randall Stone. 2018. "Plaintiffs by Proxy: A Firm-Level Approach to WTO Dispute Resolution." *The Review of International Organizations* 13(2): 273-308.
- Brutger, Ryan and Julia Morse. 2015. "Balancing Law and Politics: Judicial Incentives in WTO Dispute Settlement." *Review of International Organizations* 10(2): 179-205.

Recommended:

- Rosendorff, Peter. 2005. "Stability and Rigidity: Politics and the Design of the WTO's Dispute Resolution Procedure." *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 389-400.
- Rose, Andrew. 2007. "Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade? Reply." *American Economic Review* 97(5): 2019-2025.
- Mansfield, Edward and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. "International Institutions and the Volatility of International Trade." *International Organization* 62(4): 621-652.
- Tang, Man-Keung and Shang-Jin Wei. 2009. "The Value of Making Commitments Externally: Evidence from WTO Accessions." *Journal of International Economics* 78(2): 216-229.
- Eicher, T.S. and C. Hell. 2011. "In Search of WTO Trade Effects: Preferential Trade Agreements Promote Trade Strongly, but Unevenly." *Journal of International Economics* 83(2): 137-153.

- Rosendorff, B. Peter and Alastair Smith. 2018. Domestic Political Determinants of the Onset of WTO Disputes." *Review of International Organizations* 13(2): 243-272.
- Davis, Christina and Meredith Wilf. 2017. "Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO." *Journal of Politics* 79(3): 964-978.

## 5. Monetary Policy

Required:

- Aizenman, Joshua. 2013. "The Impossible Trinity (aka the Policy Trilemma)" in *The Evidence and Impact of Financial Globalization*, ed. Gerard Caprio. San Diego: Academic Press.
- William, Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz and William Roberts Clark. 2002. "The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions." *International Organization* 56(4): 693-723.
- Aklin, Michael and Andreas Kern. 2021. "The Side Effects of Central Bank Independence." *American Journal of Political Science* 65(4): 971-987.
- Steinberg, David. 2015. *Demanding Devaluation: Exchange Rate Politics in the Developing World*. Cornell: Cornell University Press. Read Chapters 1 and 2.
- Aklin, Michael, Eric Arias and Julia Gray. 2022. "Inflation Concerns and Mass Preferences over Exchange-Rate Policy." *Economics & Politics* 34(1): 5-40.

Recommended:

- Broz, Lawrence J. 2002. "Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes." *International Organization* 56(4): 863-889.
- Scheve, Kenneth. 2004. "Public Inflation Aversion and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policymaking." *International Organization* 58(1): 1-34.
- Simmons, Beth and Zachary Elkins. 2004. "The Globalization of Liberalization: Diffusion in International Political Economy." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 171-189.
- Broz, J. Lawrence, Jeffry Frieden, Stephen Weymouth. 2008. "Exchange Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence from Survey Data." *IMF Staff Papers* 55: 417-444.
- Bodea, Cristina. 2010. "Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks: A Correlated Choice of Imperfectly Credible Institutions." *International Organization* 64(3): 411-442.
- Guisinger, Alexandra and David Singer. 2010. "Exchange Rate Proclamations and Inflation-Fighting Credibility." *International Organization* 64(2): 313-337.
- Bearce, David and Mark Hallerberg. 2011. "Democracy and de facto Exchange Rate Regimes." *Economics & Politics* 23(2): 172-194.

## 6. Sovereign Debt

Required:

- North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *The Journal of Economic History* 49(4): 803-832.
- Beaulieu, Emily, Gary Cox and Sebastian Saiegh. 2012. "Sovereign Debt and Regime Type: Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage." *International Organization* 66(4): 709-738.

- Kaplan, Stephen and Kaj Thomsson. 2017. "The Political Economy of Sovereign Borrowing: Explaining the Choices of Highly Indebted Countries." *Journal of Politics* 79(2): 605-623.
- Tomz, Michael. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Read Chapters 1 and 2.
- **Referee Report:** TBD

Recommended:

- Stasavage, David. 2007. "Cities, Constitutions, and Sovereign Borrowing in Europe, 1274-1785." *International Organization* 61(3): 489-525.
- Cox, Gary. 2012. "Was the Glorious Revolution a Constitutional Watershed?" *The Journal of Economic History* 72(3): 567-600.
- Biglaiser, Glen and Joseph L. Staats. 2012. "Finding the 'Democratic Advantage' in Sovereign Bond Ratings: The Importance of Strong Courts, Property Rights Protection and the Rule of Law." *International Organization* 66(3): 515-535.
- Chwieroth, Jeffrey. 2014. "Fashions and Fads in Finance: The Political Foundations of Sovereign Wealth Fund Creation." *International Studies Quarterly* 58(4): 752-763.
- Campello, Daniela. 2014. "The Politics of Financial Booms and Crises: Evidence from Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(2): 260-286.
- Brooks, Sarah, Raphael Cunha and Layna Mosley. 2015. "Categories, Creditworthiness and Contagion: How Investors' Shortcuts Affect Sovereign Debt Markets." *International Studies Quarterly* 59(3): 587-601.
- Ballard-Rosa, Cameron, Layna Mosley, and Rachel Wellhausen. 2021. "Contingent Advantage? Sovereign Borrowing, Democratic Institutions and Global Capital Cycles." *British Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 353-373.
- Brooks, Sarah, Raphael Cunha and Layna Mosley. 2022. "Sovereign Risk and Government Change: Elections, Ideology and Experience" *Comparative Political Studies*. Forthcoming.

## 7. Politics of Financial Crisis

Required:

- Curtis, K. Amber, Joseph Jupille and David Leblang. 2014. "Iceland on the Rocks: The Mass Political Economy of Sovereign Debt Resettlement." *International Organization* 68(3): 721-740.
- Ballard-Rosa, Cameron. 2016. "Hungry for Change: Urban Bias and Autocratic Sovereign Default." *International Organization* 70(2): 313-346.
- Crespo-Tenorio, Adriana, Nathan M. Jensen and Guillermo Rosas. 2014. "Political Liabilities: Surviving Banking Crises." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(7): 1047-1074.
- DiGiuseppe, Matthew and Patrick E. Shea. 2019. "The Devil's Haircut: Investor-State Disputes Over Debt Restructuring." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(8): 1889-1922.
- Schneider, Christina J. and Jennifer L. Tobin. 2020. "The Political Economy of Bilateral Bailouts." *International Organization* 74(1): 1-29.

Recommended:



- Leblang, David and Shanker Satyanath. 2006. "Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises." *International Organization* 60(1): 245-262.
- Reinhart, Carmen and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2009. *This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Saiegh, Sebastian. 2009. "Coalition Governments and Sovereign Debt Crises." *Economics & Politics* 21(2): 232-254.
- Enderlein, Henrik, Christoph Trebesch and Laura von Daniels. 2012. "Sovereign Debt Disputes: A Database on Government Coerciveness during Debt Crises." *Journal of International Money and Finance* 31(2): 250-266.
- Bechtel, Michael, Jens Hainmueller and Yotam Margalit. 2014. "Preferences for International Redistribution: The Divide over the Eurozone Bailouts." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4): 835-856.
- DiGiuseppe, Matthew and Patrick E. Shea. 2015. "Sovereign Credit and the Fate of Leaders: Re-assessing the 'Democratic Advantage'." *International Studies Quarterly* 59(3): 557-570.
- Funke, Manuel, Moritz Schularick and Christoph Trebesch. 2016. "Going to Extremes: Politics after Financial Crises, 1870-2014." *European Economic Review* 88: 227-260.
- Copelovitch, Mark, Jeffrey Frieden and Stefanie Walter. 2016. "The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(4): 811-840.
- Steinberg, David. "How Voters Respond to Currency Crises: Evidence from Turkey." *Comparative Political Studies*. Forthcoming.

## 8. International Financial Institutions

Required:

- Bas, Muhammet A. and Randall W. Stone. 2014. "Adverse Selection and Growth under IMF programs." *Review of International Organizations* 9(1): 1-28.
- Stone, Randall W. 2008. "The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa." *American Political Science Review* 98(4): 577-591.
- Lipsky, Phillip and Haillie Na-Kyung Lee. 2019. "The IMF as a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises." *International Organization* 73(1):35-64.
- Clark, Richard and Lindsay R. Dolan. 2021. "Pleasing the Principal: US Influence in World Bank Policymaking." *American Journal of Political Science* 65(1): 36-51.
- Rickard, Stephanie J. and Teri L. Caraway. 2014. "International Negotiations in the Shadow of National Elections." *International Organization* 68(3): 701-20.

Recommended:

- Thacker, Strom. 1999. "The High Politics of IMF Lending." *World Politics* 52(1): 38-75.
- Gould, Erica. 2003. "Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality." *International Organization* 57(3): 551-586.
- Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee. 2005. "IMF Programs: Who is Chosen and What are the Effects." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52(7): 1245-1269.

- Broz, J. Lawrence and Michael Brewster Hawes. 2006. "Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund." *International Organization* 60(2): 367-399.
- Stone, Randall W. 2008. "The Scope of IMF Conditionality." *International Organization* 62(4): 589-620.
- Kilby, Christopher. 2009. "The Political Economy of Conditionality: An Empirical Analysis of World Bank Loan Disbursements."
- Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James Vreeland. 2009. "Global Horse Trading: IMF Loans for Votes on the United Nations Security Council." *European Economic Review* 53(7): 742-757.
- Mukherjee, Bumba and David Andrew Singer. 2010. "International Institutions and Domestic Compensation: The IMF and the Politics of Capital Account Liberalization." *American Journal of Political Science*. 54(1): 45-60.
- Copelovitch, Mark. 2010. "Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(2): 49-77.
- Chwieroth, Jeffrey. 2013. "The Silent Revolution: How the Staff Exercise Informal Governance over IMF Lending." *Review of International Organizations* 8(2): 265-290.
- Reinsberg, Bernhard, Thomas Stubbs and Alexander Kentikelenis. 2021. "Unimplementable by Design." Understanding (non)compliance with International Monetary Fund Policy Conditionality." *Governance*. Forthcoming
- Copelovitch, Mark and Ryan Powers. 2022. "Do We Really Know What We Think We Know about the Politics of IMF Lending? Measuring and Reassessing US Influence in Global Financial Governance." *Working Paper*.

## 9. Foreign Aid

Required:

- Bearce, David and Daniel Tirone. 2010. "Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor Governments." *Journal of Politics* 72(3): 837-851.
- Dietrich, Simone. 2013. "Bypass or Engage? Explaining Donor Delivery Tactics in Foreign Aid Allocation." *International Studies Quarterly* 57(4): 698-712.
- Licht, Amanda, 2010. "Coming into Money: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Survival." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(1): 58-87.
- Jablonski, Ryan. 2014. "How Aid Targets Votes: The Impact of Electoral Incentives on Foreign Aid Distribution." *World Politics* 66(2): 293-330.
- **Referee Report:** TBD

Recommended:

- Burnside, Craig and David Dollar. 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth." *American Economic Review* 90(4): 847-868.
- Easterly, William. 2003. "Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(3): 23-48.
- Milner, Helen and Dustin Tingley. 2009. "The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid." *Economics & Politics* 22(2): 200-232.

- Kono, Daniel and G. Montinola. 2009. "Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats or Both?" *Journal of Politics* 71(2): 704-718.
- Heinrich, Tobias. 2013. "When is Foreign Aid Selfish, When is it Selfless?" *Journal of Politics* 75(2): 422-435.
- Cruz, Cesi and Christina J. Schneider. 2017. "Foreign Aid and Undeserved Credit Claiming." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(2): 396-408.
- Dietrich, Simone, Minhaj Mahmud, and Matthew S. Winters. 2018. "Foreign Aid, Foreign Policy: And Domestic Government Legitimacy: Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh." *Journal of Politics* 80(1): 133-148.
- Briggs, Ryan. "Why does Aid Not Target the Poorest?" *International Studies Quarterly* 65(3): 739-752.
- de la Cuesta, Brandon, Lucy Martin, Helen Milner and Daniel Nielson. 2022. "Owning It: Accountability and Citizens' Ownership over Oil, Aid and Taxes." *Journal of Politics* 84(1): 304-320.

## 10. Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk

Required:

- Jensen, Nathan, Glen Biglaiser, Quan Li, Edmund Malesky, Pablo Pinto, Santiago Pinto and Joseph Staats. 2012. *Politics and Foreign Direct Investment*. The University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor. Read Chapters 1-4.
- Allee, Todd and Clint Peinhardt. 2011. "Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investments." *International Organization* 65(3): 401-432.
- Wellhausen, Rachel. 2015. "Investor-State Disputes: When can Governments Break Contracts?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(2): 239-261.

Recommended:

- Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. "Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000." *International Organization* 60(4): 811-846.
- Jensen, Nathan. 2008. "Political Risk, Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment." *Journal of Politics* 70(4): 1040-1052.
- Busch, Marc L. and Jennifer L. Tobin. 2010. "A BIT is better than a lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements." *World Politics* 62(1): 1-42.
- Li, Quan. 2009. "Democracy, Autocracy and the Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment." *Comparative Political Studies* 42(8):1098-1127.
- Pandya, Sonal. 2010. "Labor Markets and the Demand for Foreign Direct Investment." *International Organization* 64(3): 389-409.
- Jensen, Nathan. 2012 "Fiscal Policy and the Firm: Do Low Corporate Tax Rates Attract Multinational Corporations?" *Comparative Political Studies* 45(8): 1004-1026.
- Buthe, Tim and Helen Milner. 2008. "The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 741-762.
- Kerner, Andrew. 2014. "What we Talk about when we Talk about Foreign Direct Investment." *International Studies Quarterly* 58(4): 804-881.

- Owen, Erica. 2015. "The Political Power of Organized Labor and the Politics of Foreign Direct Investment in Developed Economies." *Comparative Political Studies* 48(13): 1746-1780.
- Pelc, Kryzstof J. 2017. "What Explains the Low Success Rate of Investor-State Disputes?" *International Organization* 71(3): 559-583.

## 11. Migration

Required:

- Scheve, Kenneth F. and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. "Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 83(1): 133-145.
- Hainmueller, Jens and Dominik Hangartner. 2013. "Who Gets a Passport? A Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimination." *American Political Science Review* 107(1): 159-187.
- Peters, Margaret. 2015. "Open Trade, Closed Borders: Immigration in the Era of Globalization" *World Politics* 67(1): 114-154.
- Singer, David. 2010. "Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World." *American Political Science Review*. 104(2): 307-323.
- Bermeo, Sarah and David Leblang. 2015. "Migration and Foreign Aid." *International Organization* 69(3): 627-657.

Recommended:

- Mayda, Anna M. 2006. "Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes towards Immigrants." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 88(3): 510-530.
- Hanson, Gordon, Kenneth F. Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2007. "Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies." *Economics & Politics* 19(1): 1-33.
- Leblang, David. 2010. "Familiarity Breeds Investment: Diaspora Networks and International Investment." *American Political Science Review* 104(3): 584-600.
- Hainmueller, Jens and Michael J. Hiscox. 2010. "Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 104(1): 61-84.
- Peters, Margaret. 2014. "Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Immigration Policymaking in the United States." *International Organization* 68(4): 811-844.
- Mosley, Layna and David Singer. 2015. "Migration, Labor, and the International Political Economy." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 18: 283-301.
- Bansak, Kirk, Jans Hainmueller and Dominik Hangartner. 2016. "How Economic, Humanitarian, and Religious Concerns Shape European Attitudes toward Asylum Seekers." *Science* 354(6309): 217-222.
- Leblang, David, Christina J. Schneider and Jennifer L. Tobin. 2019. "Framing Unpopular Foreign Policies." *American Journal of Political Science*. Forthcoming.

## 12. IPE and Security

Required:

- Savun, Burcu and Daniel C. Tirone. 2011. "Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Affect Civil Conflict?" *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2): 233-246.

- Nielson, Richard A., Michael G. Findley, Zachary S. Davis, Tara Candland and Daniel L. Nielson. 2011. "Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science*. 55(2): 219-232.
- Berger, Daniel, William Easterly, Nathan Nunn and Shanker Satyanath. 2013. "Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade During the Cold War." *American Economic Review* 103(2): 863-896.
- Allen, Michael and Matthew DiGiuseppe. 2013. "Tightening the Belt: Sovereign Debt and Alliance Formation." *International Studies Quarterly* 57(4): 647-659.
- Shea, Patrick and Paul Poast. 2018. "War and Default." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62(9): 1876-1904.

#### Recommended:

- Mansfield, Edward and Rachel Bronson. 1997. "Alliances, Preferential Trading Agreements, and International Trade." *American Political Science Review* 91(1): 94-107.
- Gartzke, Erik. 2007. "The Capitalist Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 166-191.
- Fordham, Benjamin. 2010. "Trade and Asymmetrical Alliances." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(6): 685-696.
- Hegre, Havard, John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett. 2010. "Trade Does Promote Peace: New Simultaneous Estimates of the Reciprocal Effects of Trade and Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(6): 763-774.
- Slantchev, Branislav. 2012. "Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms." *American Political Science Review* 106(4): 787-809.
- Findley, Michael, Daniel L. Nielson and J.C. Sharman. 2015. "Causes of Non-Compliance with International Law: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Financial Transparency." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1): 146-161.
- Narang, Neil. 2015. "Assisting Uncertainty: How Humanitarian Aid can Inadvertently Prolong Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* 59(1): 184-195.
- Matthew DiGiuseppe and Katja B. Kleinberg. 2019. "Economics, Security, and Individual-Level Preferences for Trade Agreements." *International Interactions* 45(2): 289-315.
- Kinne, Brandon J. and Jonas B. Bunte. 2019. "Guns or Money? Defense Co-operation and Bilateral Lending as Coevolving Networks." *British Journal of Political Science*. 50(3): 1067-1088.
- Poast, Paul. 2019. "Beyond the 'Sinew of War': The Political Economy of Security as a Subfield." *Annual Review of Political Science* 22: 223-239.

### 13. The China Question

#### Required:

- Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin Strange, and Michael J. Tierney. *Banking on Beijing: The Aims and Impacts of China's Overseas Development Program*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Liao, Steven and Daniel McDowell. 2016. "No Reservations: International Order and Demand for the Renminbi as a Reserve Currency." *International Studies Quarterly* 60(2): 272-293.

- Zietz, Alexandra O. 2021. “Emulate or Differentiate?” *Review of International Organizations* 16: 265-292.

Recommended:

- Strange, Austin M., Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks and Michael J. Tierney. 2017. “Tracking Underreported Financial Flows: China’s Development Finance and the Aid-Conflict Nexus Revisited.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(5): 935-963.
- Brazys, Samuel, Johan Elkink and Gina Kelly. 2017. “Bad Neighbors? How Co-Located Chinese and World Bank Development Projects Impact Local Corruption in Tanzania.” *The Review of International Organization* 12: 227-253.
- Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, Roland Hodler, Bradley Parks, Paul Raschky and Michael J. Tierney. 2019. “African Leaders and the Geography of China’s Foreign Assistance.” *Journal of Development Economics* 140: 44-71.
- Humphrey, Chris and Katharina Michaelowa. 2019. “China in Africa: Competition for Traditional Development Finance Institutions?” *World Development* 120: 15-28.
- Blair, Robert, Roberty Marty and Philip Roessler. 2021. “Foreign Aid and Soft Power: Great Power Competition in Africa in the Early Twenty-first Century.” *British Journal of Political Science*. *Forthcoming*.

#### 14. Mock Conference Presentations